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Introduction & Motivation
Accelerating technological change coupled with intense competition pressures companies towards shorter new product introduction cycles. In their attempt to get products to market faster, firms are finding it difficult to incorporate all consumer insights into the product development process (Badgett et al. 2002) . Consequently, which product features will turn out to be popular remains uncertain during product launch, despite the substantial market research available at their fingertips (Van der Panne et al. 2003) . This can be troublesome, especially given that consumers nowadays expect and demand a product tailor-fitted to their lifestyles (O'Regan 2009).
In this context, a retailer's direct interaction with consumers can provide rich insights. A retailer has the opportunity to learn the specific desires of consumers faster than a manufacturer (Kanellos 2005) . Through customer-centric management styles, retail giants such as Best Buy, Kroger, Target, Tesco, Walgreen, and Walmart generate significant insights on consumers' taste (Crosby 2009 , Hiemeyer 2010 , Lal et al. 2006 . One way retailers capitalize on the insights generated is by incorporating them into the store brands (SBs) they sell. Many retailers today have their SBs with some of them like Kirkland (Costco) and President's Choice (Loblaws) becoming almost as popular as national brands (NBs).
1 Recently, Amazon introduced a range of store brand products that seem perfectly tailored to customer demand capitalizing on their vast amount of data concerning consumer purchasing habits.
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In this paper, our primary objective is to identify how and how much a retailer can benefit from acquiring consumer taste information in the context of competition between NBs and SBs.
Acquiring information about uncertain tastes bring forth unique questions in the presence of SBs.
One option for the retailer in utilizing this temporarily distinct information is to launch a similar SB product. A popular example is the laptop stand introduced by AmazonBasics that is a nearly identical version of the Rain Laptop Stand which received extremely positive reviews. 3 Another option for the retailer is to launch a SB that provides a "better" fit than the NB. One such case is the Insignia spill-resistant portable DVD player of Best Buy with ruggedized exterior and simplified interface. Introduced in 2007 after noticing that many portable DVD players were purchased for young children, it became a top seller and received a Red Dot Award (Bustillo and Lawton 2009) .
In this example, NBs like Samsung and Sony perhaps overestimated the demand from tech-savvy 1 In 2009, 43% of shoppers switched from a NB to a corresponding SB, and 97% of those said they favour SBs to their previous choices (PLMA 2009).
2 Spencer Soper, "Got a Hot Seller on Amazon? Prepare for E-Tailer to Make One Too", April 20, 2016, url: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-04-20/got-a-hot-seller-on-amazon-prepare-for-e-tailer-to-makeone-too 3 Nick Bravo, "Amazon Private Labels Threaten Manufacturers", July 05, 2016, url: http://trustedinsight.trendsource.com/trusted-insight-trends/amazon-private-labels-threaten-manufacturers Nalca, Boyaci and Ray Consumer taste uncertainty in the context of store brand and national brand competition 3 consumers and underestimated the demand from adults with children, and therefore targeted the small segment with the product features included. The other option for the retailer is to share the taste information with a brand manufacturer in the spirit of "collaborative innovation" so as to develop better retailer-exclusive NB products. For instance, with its Blue Label brand, Best Buy shares information with Intel, Sony, and Toshiba as a part of their "You Spoke, We Listened" customization program which continually incorporates consumer feedback into the product development process.
In order to shed light on the value and impact of acquiring and sharing consumer taste information in the presence of NB and SB competition, we analyze a one-manufacturer and one-retailer supply chain. We model "taste" through the size of the customer segment interested in a particular product feature such as screen resolution, shock-resistance, etc. As such, we model the uncertainty in consumer taste as the uncertainty in the size of the customer segment that prefers a particular product feature. Accordingly, being informed about consumers' taste in our model setting means knowing the exact size of each segment. Our analysis consists of three steps.
1. We first characterize the equilibrium positioning and pricing strategy for a NB and a SB when consumer taste is common knowledge for both chain partners (i.e., both know the exact sizes of customer segments preferring particular product features) by endogenizing product introduction and positioning decisions in a game theoretic framework. In addition to the horizontal product differentiation that arise from heterogeneous consumers' taste, our model captures the vertical differentiation between the brands, and also the heterogeneity in consumer valuation.
2. We then characterize the exact positioning and pricing strategies when the retailer has exclusive information regarding consumers' taste. In particular, we analyze the scenario in which only the retailer is informed about consumers' taste (i.e, knows the exact sizes of customer preference segments) while the manufacturer just knows its distribution (i.e., does not know the size of customer preferences segments).
Through the comparison of optimal profits when the manufacturer is informed about consumer taste and when not (the two aforementioned scenarios), we derive the optimal retail strategy regarding information sharing and identify conditions under which the retailer should share (or withhold) information and how this affects the manufacturer.
3. We analyze the equilibrium positioning and pricing strategies when neither of the chain partners is informed about consumers' taste (i.e., both parties just know the distribution).
Through the comparison of optimal profits when the retailer is informed about consumer taste and when not, we derive the strategic value of information acquisition, which can then be traded-off against the cost associated with acquiring it. Consumer taste uncertainty in the context of store brand and national brand competition Figure 1 Scenarios modeled, analyzed, and compared in this paper. We pinpoint two fundamental effects regarding the acquisition of consumer taste information.
The direct effect is that the retailer can make more profitable SB introduction and positioning decisions. The indirect effect is that if the retailer shares taste information, then the manufacturer can also make better NB positioning decisions. The indirect effect benefits (hurts) the retailer, if the NB positioning by an "informed" manufacturer yields a high (lower) degree of horizontal differentiation between the two brands. We show that these two effects interact with each other and the nature of their interaction varies with operating factors such as the cost of SB introduction, the degree of vertical differentiation between the brands, and the relative sizes of the customer segment interested in each product feature.
Regarding the cost associated with SB introduction, for instance, we show that if SB introduction cost is significantly high, then there is no direct effect and the indirect effect is observed in isolation.
In this situation, the retailer shares information with the manufacturer and both parties benefit from information acquisition. However, if the SB introduction cost is low, then the specific outcome depends on the size of customer segment interested in each product feature. On one hand, if the market is skewed, i.e., majority of consumers prefer a particular feature, then both the direct and the indirect effects are positive for the retailer. In fact, the indirect effect augments the direct effect.
As a result, the retailer shares taste information with the manufacturer and both parties benefit from information acquisition. On the other hand, if the market is symmetric, i.e, all the product features are more or less equally popular, then the indirect effect is negative for the retailer and diminishes the value of the direct effect -which motivates the retailer to withhold information.
We also generate managerial insights as to the value of consumer taste information for the retailer. It is plausible that retail managers consider information acquisition decision concurrently with investment decisions to improve SB equity; therefore, we investigate how SB equity shapes the value of consumer taste information. According to our analysis, retail managers should be cautious about these decisions since information acquisition and SB equity improvement may be complementary or supplementary to each other depending on the business environment.
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Related Literature
There is a substantial literature focusing on information sharing related issues in supply chain interactions. Early work in this stream investigates how information sharing affects the ordering and inventory decisions (Aviv and Federgruen 1998 , Cachon and Fisher 2000 , Chen 1998 , Gavirneni et al. 1999 , Lee et al. 2000 and reduce the risk of information distortion (Lee et al. 2004 ). Chen (2003 provides an excellent review on the role of information in achieving supply chain coordination. 4 Similar to this stream of work, we also investigate the information sharing incentives for the retailer. However, we add to this stream by identifying the impact of information sharing on the nature of NB and SB competition. Our work is more related to the research exploring the impact of retailer's strategic information sharing on the pricing and ordering decisions. Representative papers in this stream include Chu and Lee (2006) , Guo (2009), and Guo et al. (2014) . Chu and Lee (2006) study a dyadic supply chain in which the retailer does not pre-commit to information sharing but decides ex-post whether to share private demand information with a manufacturer.
The manufacturer decides on the stocking level given the wholesale price. Guo (2009) looks at the same problem but with wholesale price as a decision variable for the manufacturer. Guo et al.
(2014) extends Guo (2009) by considering competing channels. In these studies, the retailer acquires information about the size of the population interested in a single product (like NB). In our model, similarly, the retailer can acquire demand information and decides ex-post whether or not to share information. However, there are two major differences of our model. The retailer can use the demand information for a better positioning of its own product, the SB. Furthermore, if the retailer shares information, then the manufacturer uses this information in NB positioning. In other words, the supply chain interaction in our model involves not only the competition between the vertically differentiated NB and SB, but also captures the impact of information sharing on this competition through the positioning of the two products.
The growing popularity of SBs in industry has received significant interest from the academic community. We refer the reader to Sethuraman (2009) for an extensive review of SB research. The most relevant stream of research explores the ramifications of SB introduction on the performance of supply chain partners. 5 One direct implication of SB introduction is that it makes the retailer a competitor of the manufacturer (Amrouche and Zaccour 2007) . Consequently, SB introduction 4 More recent work on this domain investigate the incentives for chain partners to share demand and inventory information (Gal-Or et al. 2008 , Niraj and Narasimhan 2004 , Zhao et al. 2002 , contract types that facilitate information sharing (Cachon and Lariviere 2001 , Ha and Tong 2008 , He et al. 2008 , Kong et al. 2013 , Thonemann 2002 ,Özer and Wei 2006 , Yue and Liu 2006 , and the role of trust in information sharing (Özer et al. 2011, 2014) 5 Another stream of research less related to our work considers the supply chain efficiency and coordination problems in the face of SB introduction (Chen et al. 2009 , Fang et al. 2011 , Groznik and Heese 2010a , Kurata et al. 2007 , Sachon and Martınez-de Albéniz 2009 , Xia and Gilbert 2007 as well as the impact of SB introduction in the context of competing retailers Heese 2010b, Liao and Yano 2013) .
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Consumer taste uncertainty in the context of store brand and national brand competition benefits the retailer not only by reaching a larger set of consumers through a larger assortment (Soberman and Parker 2004) , but also by engendering better NB supply terms from the manufacturer, e.g., lower wholesale prices (Meza and Sudhir 2010, Mills 1995) . Our model captures these dimensions as well. One contribution of our setting is that it considers the possibility that retailers -through their direct contact with consumers -learn about consumer preferences. Investigating information sharing incentives enables us to endogenize the retailer's role in the positioning of NB and SB products.
Lastly, previous work such as , Krol (2011) , and Meagher and Zauner (2005) consider the impact of uncertain consumers' taste; however, they neither consider vertical manufacturer-retailer interaction nor NB-SB competition. In this stream, most related to our work are Du et al. (2005) and Morton and Zettelmeyer (2004) both of which investigate SB positioning compared to existing NB products. In these papers, SB can be positioned to satisfy the tastes of different customer segments; however, the positioning of the NBs are exogenously set and firms are fully informed about consumers' taste while making decisions. In our model setting, we do not address the competition across NBs. But, we enrich the NB-SB competition literature by endogenizing the manufacturer's NB positioning decision. Moreover, we investigate the impact of uncertainty in consumers' taste and the issues related to information acquisition and sharing arising from that uncertainty.
To summarize, in relation to the existing literature, the main contribution of our paper is that we shed light on the impact of consumer taste uncertainty and its role on the positioning of competing brands. We achieve this by explicitly modelling the uncertainty in consumers' taste (rather than uncertain aggregate demand), allowing the retailer to acquire and share this information (rather than assuming that NB manufacturers are fully informed), and investigating the positioning of both the NB and SB (rather than SB only) in light of this information.
Model Framework
Our framework consists of a single manufacturer (she) and a single retailer (he). The manufacturer owns a NB for which she is in control of activities such as design and production. She sells the NB through the retailer. The retailer has the option to introduce and sell a SB in addition to the NB. The SB is produced in a vertically integrated fashion (internally or via subcontracting)
meaning that all the decisions regarding the SB such as design, production, and pricing are made by the retailer. We focus on a single-period framework since both products are assumed to have relatively short life cycles, e.g., fashion products (see Fisher 1997) . So, consumers are impatient and their waiting behaviour is not relevant (Balachander and Srinivasan 1998) . Our demand model Nalca, Boyaci and Ray Consumer taste uncertainty in the context of store brand and national brand competition 7 captures vertical differentiation, horizontal differentiation, uncertainty and heterogeneity in consumers' taste, and heterogeneity in consumers' valuations. In this section, we develop a model of consumer choice, present the market structure and the detailed order of events.
Utility Framework
Each consumer in the market purchases one unit of the product, either a SB or a NB, that maximizes her/his utility. If neither of the products provide a nonnegative utility, then the consumer leaves the market. Our consumer choice model originates from the utility function for horizontally and vertically differentiated products by Desai (2001) . Consumers' utility, net of the retail price, from each product is as follows:
net utility = valuation * brand equity − misfit − price.
The valuation represents a consumer's willingness to pay for his/her ideal product. Our model allows for heterogeneity in valuation via a continuum of consumers indexed by their type υ, which is uniformly distributed over a unit line. Consumer type is private information and only their distribution is known to the firms.
The brand equity captures the vertical differentiation in quality since everything else being equal, consumers prefer the higher quality product. It is common in the literature to assume that NBs enjoy a higher equity than SBs. Traditionally, this assumption was based on the idea that consumers perceive NBs to be superior in quality and reliability. Later on, consistent evidence has been presented to show that SBs can offer the same or even better quality (Quelch and Harding 2004 ).
Yet, NBs are still able to capture a reputation premium regardless of the comparative quality. Sethuraman (2003) shows that consumers are willing to pay a 37% premium for NBs over SBs; nearly 80% of the premium is attributed to the brand equity. Moreover, 85% of the total brand equity is due to non-quality equity, which is defined as the premium that consumers would pay for NBs even when they perceive no quality difference. Although there may be exceptions, consistent with the above observations, we assume NB equity to be higher than SB equity. We normalize the NB equity to 1 and set SB equity as e, where e < 1. Accordingly, 1 − e is the measure of vertical differentiation between the two brands.
The misfit (or mismatch) measures the gap between the features present in a product and the features desired by a particular consumer type. Consumers are heterogeneous in terms of the desired product features; this is the source of consumer taste uncertainty, the main focus of our paper. In other words, for a given product, the degree of misfit varies randomly across consumer types.
Note that the retailer faces two kinds of uncertainty from the consumers side, the uncertainty in the valuation of a customer type and the uncertainty in terms of the fit between a product and features desired by the consumer type. We discuss the taste uncertainty in more detail in §3.2.
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Market Structure
We use a spatial model with two consumer segments, A and B, each with its own ideal product design represented by the end points of a unit line, points A and B. There are three possible points for the NB and the SB to place their products in this product-feature space: the center (point C) and the two ends of the unit line (points A and B). If a product is located at the center, we label it as generic meaning that it is somewhat appealing to all consumers in the market.
If a product is located at one of the end points, we label it as specialized meaning that it is appealing only to a specific subgroup of consumers. The distance between the consumer segment and the product determines the degree of misfit. Let parameter t represent the travel cost per unit of distance traveled. A higher t implies greater differentiation between the tastes of consumer segments. Consequently, misfit ∈ 0, t 2
, t depending on the distance between the location of the consumer segment and the brand. Within each segment, consumers are heterogeneous with respect to valuation.
During our analysis, we assume that the degree of horizontal differentiation between the two consumer segments is sufficiently high that a product located at point A cannot attract consumers from segment B even if it is priced at the marginal cost. Similarly, a product located at point B cannot attract consumers from segment A. As a result, offering a generic product is the only way to appeal to both segments. Note that this is in alignment with the idea of a generic versus specialized product (Ghosh and Balachander 2007) . The mathematical translation of our assumption is t ≥ 1.
We model the uncertainty in consumers' taste through the size of each segment. The total number of consumers in the market is constant, and without loss of generality, we normalize it to 1. The sizes of segments A and B are denoted by α and 1 − α, respectively. We assume that α is random and uniformly distributed between 0 and 1. This distribution function is common knowledge. However, the exact size of each segment is not known to either of the chain partners.
Our market structure with two customer segments is similar to Du et al. (2005) and Morton and Zettelmeyer (2004) . In both these papers, the size of the customer segments is known to the firms in advance. In particular, Du et al. (2005) assumes that the two segments have equal masses and Morton and Zettelmeyer (2004) allows the two segments to have unequal masses. We extend this framework such that the two segments have random and unequal masses. An important characteristic of our demand model is that firms have perfect information about the potential product positions and how these positions are valued representative customers. This is in alignment with the reality that firms can use a variety of strategies such as conducting market research and increasing customer orientation to be informed about the product attributes and features considered important by consumers (Cooper 1990, Gatignon and Xuereb 1997) . However, firms in our model have limited information with respect to the final taste choices of individual consumers captured by the uncertainty on the size of each segment. As a result, firms face uncertainty while making their product positioning decisions. In that sense, we are not asserting that the retailer has better ex-ante information compared to the manufacturer about consumers' valuations of different attributes and features. Rather, we assume that the retailer has the ability to capture the final taste choices of individual consumers, i.e, the size of each segment much quicker than the manufacturer. Furthermore, we incorporate this assumption into our static model setting by allowing the retailer to resolve the taste uncertainty, through information acquisition, before the manufacturer, as in the works of Chu and Lee (2006) , Guo (2009) , and Guo and Iyer (2010) .
As an example, refer to the Insignia portable DVD player that was discussed in §1. The vertical differentiation in that context refers to the perceived quality differential of the Insignia brand relative to the NB in the category (e.g., Samsung, Sony, LG). Moreover, the ex-ante uncertainty regarding product features are between the technical features such as screen resolution/battery life and toughness such as shock-resistance. In this setting, the NB positioned its product by investing on technical features. However, realizing that the majority of customers are interested in this product for children and value shock and spill resistance, Best Buy capitalized on its private consumer taste information by introducing an Insignia DVD player with a ruggedized exterior. In other words, the SB Insignia focused on the toughness as a product feature, while the NB focused on technical features such as screen resolution, weight, etc.
Sequence of Events
We categorize the relevant decisions made by the retailer and the manufacturer into three stages:
(i) information acquisition and sharing, (ii) product introduction and positioning, and (iii) pricing. Consumer taste uncertainty in the context of store brand and national brand competition
Figure 3
Detailed sequence of events and the corresponding sections.
Retailer acquires informa1on
Informa ( In the information acquisition and sharing stage, the retailer acquires information on consumers' taste, i.e., a realization of α is revealed only to the retailer. After acquiring the information, he decides whether or not to share this information with the manufacturer. If he shares information, then it is available to the manufacturer immediately. Given that our focus is to investigate the retailer's incentive to share consumer taste information, in line with the related literature (e.g. Guo 2009 , Ha and Tong 2008 ,Özer 2003 , we assume that if there is information sharing, then the provided information will be truthful and credible. As in Guo (2009) , truthful information sharing in our model is motivated by the long-term channel interaction and can be sustained while developing and maintaining a trustworthy channel relationship. Note that although information acquisition is costless, we report on the value and the impact of the acquired information thorough the comparison of two scenarios: information acquisition and no information acquisition.
The product introduction and positioning stage, the second stage, starts with the launch of the NB by the manufacturer. The retailer follows by announcing whether a SB is being introduced or not, along with the specifications of the product -if it is being introduced. Three scenarios are possible in this stage for the manufacturer. In the first scenario, the retailer shares information about consumers' taste. So, the manufacturer places the NB knowing the exact size of each segment, and so does the retailer. In the second scenario, the retailer acquires, but does not share the information. So, the manufacturer places the NB based on the distribution of demand, knowing that the retailer knows the exact size of each segment. In the third scenario, the retailer does not acquire information. So, the manufacturer places the NB based on the distribution of demand knowing that the retailer will also do the same. In terms of product positioning strategy, the retailer has two options given the manufacturer's NB. The retailer may choose to imitate by introducing a SB identical to the NB in terms of product features, i.e., co-locate the SB with the NB. Alternatively, the retailer may choose to differentiate by introducing a SB with unique features, i.e., locating the SB at a different location than the NB.
The pricing stage, the third stage, is also a sequential game. After the introduction of products, the retailer and the manufacturer can quickly gather information about the specific features that are desired by consumers and the distribution of customers in terms of their tastes. We approximate this fact by allowing the firms to instantaneously capture consumers' taste and rapidly adjust prices.
6 This means that, in the pricing stage, both parties are informed about the consumers' taste even if the retailer had not shared or had not acquired information. Knowing the size of each segment, the manufacturer first announces the wholesale price, w, for the NB. The retailer follows by announcing the price for the NB, p N and for the SB, p S .
Similar to previous studies, we assume that the marginal production costs for NB and SB are equal and negligible (Du et al. 2005 , Sayman et al. 2002 , Morton and Zettelmeyer 2004 , Raju et al. 1995 , Vandenbosch and Weinberg 1995 . This assumption allows us to focus on the information sharing and product positioning conundrums.
It also costs the retailer to introduce and maintain a SB. In fact, this cost can be significant for small retailers as large retailers are better positioned to build scale economies than smaller chains (Dhar and Hoch 1997) . In order to factor in this variation, we assume that the retailer incurs a fixed cost F as soon as he decides to introduce a SB. It is established in the literature that fixed costs play a major part in determining the number of distinct products offered to customers (Groznik and Heese 2010a ,b, Chen et al. 2009 , Horowitz 2000 , Soberman and Parker 2004 This fixed cost is associated with the research and development, design, patenting, product introduction, marketing, promotion, advertisement, supplier selection, warehousing, and distribution costs that are incurred prior to, and always independent of, the volume of output and sales.
6 Making price decisions after the uncertainty regarding consumer preferences is resolved is in line with most of the literature involving uncertain taste (e.g. Biyalogorsky and Koenigsberg 2010 , Bonein and Turolla 2009 , Javier CasadoIzaga 2000 . Furthermore, this setup allows us to focus on the impact of information on the product positioning decisions in the context of consumer taste uncertainty.
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Analysis
At each stage, involved parties make decisions sequentially and we seek subgame perfect equilibrium. Working backwards, our analysis is performed in three sections: the pricing stage, the product introduction and positioning stage, and the information acquisition and sharing stage.
Pricing Stage
Recall that the pricing decisions in our model are made after the uncertainty regarding the consumers' taste is resolved. In other words, the retailer and the manufacturer have full information about the size of each segment during the pricing stage in addition to the positioning of the two brands. There are three potential locations for each brand. In addition, the retailer may decide not to introduce a SB due to the high fixed cost. Therefore, we need to consider twelve product positioning combinations. In order to generate some insights about the pricing stage, we first report on the derivation of demand for four representative scenarios. In the first three cases the manufacturer introduces a specialized product for segment A and the retailer either has a specialized product for A, or a generic product (at C), or a specialized product for segment B. In the fourth scenario, the manufacturer and the retailer both introduce a generic product.
denote the resulting demands for the NB and SB, respectively.
NB and SB located at point A:
In this case, the NB and the SB are targeting segment A, so the utility achieved by consumers in segment A are u N A (υ) = υ − p N and u SA (υ) = υe − p S , and consumers in segment B achieve no utility from these products. We derive the demand by locating two particular consumers: the marginal consumer who is indifferent between purchasing NB and SB, i.e., {υ|u N A (υ) = u SA (υ)}, and the marginal consumer who is indifferent between SB and no purchase i.e., {υ|u SA (υ) = 0}. Accordingly, the demands for NB and
NB located at A and SB located at C: In this case, NB is targeting A, so u N A (υ) = υ − p N and u N B (υ) = 0. The SB is trying to appeal to both segments, so
We locate three particular consumers: the marginal consumer in A who is indifferent between the two products, the marginal consumer in A who is indifferent between SB and no purchase, and the marginal consumer in B who is indifferent between SB and no purchase. Accordingly,
NB located at A and SB located at B: The NB is targeting A and the SB is targeting B;
Demand is driven by locating the marginal consumer in A who is indifferent between NB and no purchase and the marginal consumer in B who is indifferent between SB and no purchase. Accordingly,
Nalca, Boyaci and Ray Consumer taste uncertainty in the context of store brand and national brand competition 13 NB and SB located at the C: The utility of each segment is identical:
Demand is driven by identifying the marginal consumer indifferent between NB and SB, and the marginal consumer indifferent between SB and no purchase. Accordingly,
The demand for the remaining cases can be derived similarly just by swapping the location of the NB and the SB, or by removing the SB. Recall that we assume that the taste preferences of the two customer segments are sufficiently differentiated. As a result, for instance, a product located at point A can only attract customers from segment A and cannot profitably attract customers from segment B. This assumption, also made by Du et al. (2005) , simplifies the demand derivation and pricing stage of our analysis by reducing the number of possible ways of partitioning the customers segments based on their preferred products. If the degree of differentiation between the consumer segments were low, then a misjudgement in terms of product positioning could be mitigated through precise pricing strategies. In that sense, our assumption for a high degree of differentiation brings attention to the value of taste information and important role of product positioning.
The manufacturer, as the leader of the sequential game, sets the wholesale price and the retailer follows her by setting the prices of the two products. The profits for the retailer and the manufacturer, respectively, are then given by,
For the sake of expositional clarity and brevity, we bypass the derivation of the equilibrium solution of the pricing stage and summarize the results in Table 1 . All the technical details including the derivation of the equilibrium prices and profits are provided in the appendix.
An important observation, that will be useful in the remaining stages of the analysis, is as follows.
If the SB is located close to the NB (i.e., imitation strategy), then the low degree of horizontal differentiation between the two brands intensifies the price competition between them. This reduces the retail prices for the NB and the SB. Moreover, it reduces the degree of double-marginalization, i.e., reduces the wholesale price, and therefore, hurts the manufacturer. However, the retailer is able to capture a higher margin and achieves higher profits from the NB sales, as expected. Conversely, if the SB is located far from the NB (i.e., differentiation strategy), then this leads to an increase in the wholesale price, and the retail price of the NB, and therefore, benefits the manufacturer while hurting the retailer.
Consumer taste uncertainty in the context of store brand and national brand competition Table 1 Equilibrium of the pricing game in stage-three. (1−α)(2−t) 8
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Product Introduction and Positioning Stage
In this section, we identify the equilibrium product introduction and positioning under three distinct scenarios: (i) the retailer acquires and shares taste information with the manufacturer, (ii) the retailer acquires, but does not share information with the manufacturer, and (iii) the retailer does not acquire information. We initially report on the retailer's SB introduction and positioning strategy, when he is informed about consumers' taste, in response to a given NB position. This preliminary analysis constitutes the backbone of our analysis in the following sections and also allows us to identify the economic incentives shaping the retailer's product positioning.
Preliminary Analysis:
Retailer's SB Strategy Given the NB location, the retailer chooses the best amongst three options, i.e, target one of the segments (A or B) with a specialized product or target both via a generic product, while considering its implications on the wholesale price for the NB, retail prices for both brands, and the profits. The following proposition summarizes the retailer's optimal SB strategy.
Proposition 1. The following are true for SB positioning (given the position of the NB) if the retailer has acquired taste information.
• Suppose that the NB is a specialized product. If the fixed SB introduction cost is high, then the retailer should not introduce a SB. If the SB cost is not very high, then the retailer introduces a SB and: (i) imitates if the size of the segment targeted by the NB is sufficiently large (ii) differentiates if the size of the segment targeted by the NB is small.
• Suppose that the NB is a generic product. The retailer should introduce a SB with the more preferred feature as long as the size of the targeted segment is sufficiently large, and not introduce a SB otherwise.
A full characterization and a detailed description of the SB strategy is provided in Table 2 . Table 2 Retailer's SB positioning given the NB (retailer has taste information).
The information about the size of each customer segment allows the retailer to position the SB by considering precise price implications. To describe the main effects shaping his response, we first focus on the special case of no fixed cost and then discuss the implications of the fixed cost.
Let us start with the case of a specialized NB. Suppose that the manufacturer introduces a specialized product at A. If the size of segment A is sufficiently large (just being > 50% is not sufficient), then the retailer imitates the NB by introducing a SB with identical features, i.e., we observe minimal-differentiation (Tirole 1988) . On the other hand, if the customer segment targeted by the manufacturer is relatively small, then the retailer targets the other customer segment, i.e., we observe maximal-differentiation (Shaked and Sutton 1982) . There are two main effects taken into account by the retailer while positioning the SB: demand effect and competition effect. 7 The demand effect motivates the retailer to move towards the larger customer segment to increase the size of the captive market for his SB. The competition effect motivates the retailer to move towards the NB in order to reduce the degree of double-marginalization by intensifying price competition between the NB and the SB. The competition effect always motivates minimaldifferentiation for the retailer. However, the demand effect motivates minimal-differentiation only if the size of the customer segment targeted by the NB is sufficiently large (greater than 2 3 to be precise); otherwise, the demand effect motivates maximal-differentiation. When the two effects are combined, we observe that the demand effect dominates and leads to maximal-differentiation if the size of the customer segment targeted by the NB is less than 4 7
and the competition effect dominates and leads to minimal-differentiation otherwise.
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It is important to note at this point that the actions (in terms of positioning) instigated by the demand effect and the competition effect in our setting can be different than the usual actions they motivate in the related literature. Traditionally, the demand effect encourages minimaldifferentiation since having a similar product garners a larger customer segment. In our setting, however, the demand effect motivates minimal-differentiation only when the segment targeted by the NB is sufficiently large and motivates maximal-differentiation otherwise. Traditionally, the competition effect motivates maximal-differentiation to relax the price competition. In our setting, however, the competition effect motivates the retailer for minimal-differentiation. The reason is that minimal-differentiation reduces the degree of double-marginalization and increases the retailer's profitability from the NB. As such, the underlying motivation for the retailer to minimally differentiate is not necessarily to increase SB sales or to attract customers from the NB. Rather, the motivation is to increase the total profitability by increasing the profit margin of the NB despite the decrease in SB sales.
If the manufacturer introduces a generic NB, then the retailer targets the larger customer segment with its SB. The motivation for the retailer to introduce a specialized product is to capitalize on the market size and also decrease the degree of price competition between the NB and SB. If, instead, the retailer introduced a generic product, then there would be no horizontal differentiation between the two products, and this would intensify the degree of price competition. Introducing a specialized product eliminates the price competition between the two brands since the NB is sold to the smaller customer segment only.
In terms of the impact of the fixed SB introduction cost, naturally, there exists a threshold value for the fixed cost above which the retailer does not introduce a SB. Furthermore, the threshold value for the fixed cost increases as the size of the segment targeted by the SB increases. This is because the demand for the SB, and therefore the revenue generated by the SB introduction, increases as the size of the target segment increases.
Next, we investigate three distinct scenarios regarding overall product introduction and pricing equilibrium. In §4.2.2 the retailer acquires and shares taste information with the manufacturer, in §4.2.3 the retailer acquires, but does not share information with the manufacturer, and in §4.2.4
the retailer does not acquire information.
Equilibrium When Retailer Acquires and Shares Information:
In this section, we describe the equilibrium solution when the retailer shares consumer taste information. There are four different equilibrium structures that we characterize based on the SB equity (e), the fixed cost of SB introduction (F ), and the degree of market-preference, i.e., size difference between the large and the small customer segments, which we denote as ∆ ≡ |α − (1 − α)|. Note that ∆ ∈ [0, 1] does not represent a preference towards a particular feature, but rather the degree of asymmetry between the sizes of two segments. That is, a low ∆ means a weak preference market in that customers do not have a significant preference between the two product features, i.e., the two are more or less equally popular. For instance, ∆ = 0 means a no-preference market, i.e., neither of the features is more popular than the other. A high ∆ means a strong preference market in that majority of consumers prefer one particular product feature; ∆ = 1 means absolute preference in that all consumers prefer the same product feature. Looking at the size difference between the two segments instead of the absolute sizes of the two segments does not impose any restrictions in our analysis because the equilibrium solutions are symmetric about the line α = 1 2 , i.e., when the two customers segments are equal sized.
Proposition 2. Suppose that the retailer shares consumers' taste information with the manufacturer.
• If the fixed SB introduction cost is low, then there are three equilibria.
1.
If there is a strong preference market: the equilibrium exhibits minimal-differentiation in which both the NB and the SB include the more popular feature in their designs.
2.
If there is a mild preference market: the equilibrium exhibits maximal-differentiation with a dominant SB, i.e., the SB and NB integrate the more and less popular feature, respectively.
3.
If there is a weak preference market: the equilibrium exhibits maximal-differentiation with a dominant NB, i.e., the NB and SB integrate the more and less popular feature, respectively.
• If the fixed SB introduction cost is high, then NB integrates the popular feature and there is no SB.
A full characterization and a detailed description of the equilibrium is provided in Figure 4 .
The degree of market-preference allows a simple presentation of the resulting equilibrium as depicted in Figure 4 . For instance, if ∆ ≥ max{ e 2−e , 32F 3e − 1}, i.e., if the majority of consumers prefer one product feature, then both the NB and the SB include that feature in their designs.
In terms of the specific equilibrium solution, this area would represent one of the following two outcomes. If segment A is sufficiently larger than segment B (if ), then both NB and SB will be located at point B and target customer segment B.
In order to highlight the dependence of product positioning on consumer taste, let us first look at the special case with no fixed cost. If ∆ ≥ 1 7
, the retailer will target the larger segment regardless of the position of the NB. So, if the manufacturer targets the larger segment, then there will be minimal-differentiation and if the manufacturer targets the smaller segment, then there will be Consumer taste uncertainty in the context of store brand and national brand competition 
Only NB * where ∆ = |α − (1 − α)| is the size difference between the segments maximal-differentiation. The manufacturer's decision depends on the following effects. The demand effect motivates the manufacturer to place the NB with the larger segment and the competition effect motivates maximal-differentiation in order to increase profits via a higher wholesale price.
If consumers have a strong preference for a particular feature (∆ ≥ e 2−e ), then the demand effect dominates and we observe minimal-differentiation whereby both parties introduce a specialized product with the popular feature.
If there is a mild preference market (
), then the competition effect dominates and we have maximal-differentiation with a dominant SB, i.e., SB appeals to the larger segment while NB targets the smaller segment. In other words, the manufacturer proactively differentiates its product with the features that appeal to the smaller customer segment. Note that our model setting differs from the extant literature (Du et al. 2005, Morton and Zettelmeyer 2004) in that we allow both the retailer and the manufacturer to position their products in a game theoretic setting as opposed to having exogenously positioned NBs. As a result, we identify conditions under which the manufacturer is willing to deliberately target the smaller customer segment and leave the larger customer segment to the SB, in order to maximize profitability rather than maximizing its market share. The main motivation for the manufacturer is to reduce the degree of competition between the NB and the SB so that she can achieve a higher margin.
If there is a weak preference market (∆ ≤ 1 7 ), then the competition effect again dominates for the retailer and the retailer again prefers maximal-differentiation, but the product positioning is exactly the opposite of the above. Specifically, the retailer will now wait for the manufacturer to position the NB and target the opposite segment with the SB. Knowing this, the manufacturer takes advantage of being the leader in the product positioning game and targets the larger segment (and so the retailer gets the smaller segment).
In terms of the SB introduction, there exists a threshold value for the fixed cost such that the retailer introduces a SB only if the fixed cost is below the threshold. Introducing a SB is most difficult when the customer preferences are such that the retailer is indifferent between minimal Nalca, Boyaci and Ray Consumer taste uncertainty in the context of store brand and national brand competition 19 and maximal differentiations. However, given the preferred positioning of the SB, it becomes more affordable for the retailer to introduce a SB if the features of the SB are preferred by more customers. For instance, if the retailer would like to place its SB at the location of the larger segment, then the fixed cost threshold that he can afford increases as the size of this segment increases.
Equilibrium When Retailer Acquires and Does Not Share Information:
In this section, we identify how the manufacturer would place the NB knowing that the retailer is informed about consumers' taste. The manufacturer is not informed, and consequently, seeks to optimize her expected profit while placing the NB. Technically, for a particular NB position, the manufacturer takes into account the positioning of the SB contingent on the realized size of each segment and takes an expectation over that distribution. The expected profit of the manufacturer if the NB is placed at point A and point C are presented below. Note that the size of A and B are α and 1 − α, respectively, and α is uniformly distributed between 0 and 1. As a result, segments A and B are both uniformly distributed between 0 and 1.More importantly, the market structure is symmetric about point C.
The manufacturer knows that the retailer has acquired taste information and has chosen not to share this information. This could allow the manufacturer to deduce information as to specific outcome of taste uncertainty (i.e, a separating equilibrium). However, due to the symmetry of the market structure, the manufacturer cannot differentiate if the market is skewed towards point A or B. In other words, while deriving the equilibrium strategy of the manufacturer, we show that there is a pooling equilibrium in the sense that the fact that the retailer did not share information does not make the manufacturer biased towards location A or B. As a result, manufacturer's expected profit if NB is placed at A or an B are identical, i.e., the value of the two possible specialized products are ex-ante identical for the manufacturer in the absence of any taste information.
The trade-off faced by the manufacturer when placing the NB is as follows. If the manufacturer introduces a generic product, then the retailer always introduces a specialized product and targets the larger segment with the SB. The manufacturer is left with the smaller segment for her generic product. In this case, having a specialized product targeting the smaller segment would be more profitable for the manufacturer because the better fit of product features will increase the willingness to pay for that segment. In other words, the manufacturer can avoid price competition by following a "safe" strategy and introducing a specialized product. The risk in introducing a specialized NB is that the retailer may imitate by introducing a SB with identical features, and intensify the price competition between the NB and the SB. This would hurt the manufacturer's profit due to reduced margin. However, the retailer imitates only if the size of the segment is significantly high, which also reduces the risk associated with introducing a specialized NB. We formalize in the following proposition that the latter is the more profitable strategy for the manufacturer.
Proposition 3. If the retailer does not share consumer taste information, then the manufacturer introduces a specialized product with either one of the two features. Subsequently, the retailer positions the SB as described in Proposition 1.
The manufacturer is better of by introducing a specialized product compared to introducing a generic one and is indifferent between the two locations (A and B). Once the taste uncertainty is resolved, the NB happens to be located with either the larger customer segment or the smaller customer segment and the retailer positions the SB accordingly.
Note that the retailer makes a decision in the first stage of the game, in terms of information sharing, by comparing the results of the information sharing and no information sharing cases.
However, in order to determine the value of information acquisition, in the next section, we look at the case where the retailer does not acquire taste information.
Equilibrium When Retailer Does Not Acquire Information:
If the retailer does not acquire taste information, then the manufacturer and the retailer place their products without knowing the exact size of the consumer segments (i.e., they both only know the distribution of α).
Proposition 4. Suppose that the retailer does not acquire consumer taste information.
• If e ≥ 8F , then the equilibrium exhibits maximal-differentiation in which the manufacturer introduces a specialized NB with either one of the features and the retailer introduces a specialized SB with the opposite feature.
• If e ≤ 8F , then the manufacturer introduces a specialized NB with one of the features and the retailer does not introduce a SB.
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Note that in the absence of any information, if the manufacturer introduces a generic NB, then the retailer will introduce a specialized product. In addition, the manufacturer is ex-ante indifferent between the two specialized alternatives for the retailer. If the manufacturer introduces a specialized product, then the retailer will introduce a specialized SB at the opposite end. Realizing that the retailer always responds with a differentiated specialized product, the manufacturer sees no value in introducing a generic product. So, in the absence of taste information, the manufacturer introduces a specialized NB with either one of the features, and the retailer introduces a specialized SB with the other feature.
Information Acquisition and Sharing Stage
This section is divided into two parts. In §4.3.1, we focus on the scenario in which the retailer acquires consumers' taste information and identify the conditions under which it is profitable for the retailer to share that information. We do so by comparing the retail profits when the retailer shares information ( §4.2.2) and when he withholds information ( §4.2.3). In §4.3.2, we report on the value of acquired information by comparing the profits when the retailer does not acquire information ( §4.2.4) and acquires information ( §4.3.1). Proposition 5. The retailer's optimal information sharing strategy is as follows.
When Should the Retailer
• If the degree of market-preference is such that max{0,
− 1}, then the retailer does not share information with the manufacturer.
• Otherwise, the retailer voluntarily shares taste information with the manufacturer.
The resulting equilibrium structure in summarized in Figure 5 . In particular, there are two cases where the retailer chooses not to share information with the manufacturer. The first case is when there is relatively weak market-preference (i.e., ∆ ≤ min{ 
In essence, after observing the market-preference, the retailer decides whether or not to share this taste information with the manufacturer. For any observed degree of market-preference by the retailer, it is beneficial for him to share this information with the manufacturer if he cannot introduce a SB. Information sharing allows the manufacturer to introduce a better fit product and this benefits both supply chain partners. If, on the other hand, the retailer can introduce a SB, then the optimal information strategy heavily depends on the observed degree of market-preference.
If there is a very weak-preference for a particular feature (∆ ≤ 1 7
), then there is no benefit of information sharing for the retailer. If there is mild-preference market (
), then the retailer should share information only if the fixed cost of SB introduction is not very high. By sharing information, the retailer shows to the manufacturer that one particular feature is popular amongst consumers, and that he will integrate this feature into the SB. The manufacturer, after learning the consumers' taste and understanding that the retailer will integrate the popular feature into his SB design, differentiates her NB in order to reduce the price competition between the two brands.
If there is a strong-preference market, then the retailer should also share information with the manufacturer. Similar to the previous scenario, by sharing information, the retailer communicates to the manufacturer which feature is popular, how popular it is, and that he will integrate this feature into his SB design. Seeing the very large number of customers interested in a particular feature, the manufacturer also integrates this feature into her NB design. The retailer settles to a minimaldifferentiation scenario by sharing information instead of a possible maximal-differentiation with dominant SB scenario that could be realized if the information was withheld. In other words, the retailer shares information even in scenarios at which it intensifies the degree of price competition.
By doing so, the retailer takes a hit in terms of the profitability of the SB due to the intensified competition between the NB and the SB. However, the increase in the profitability of the NB, because of the significant competition effect and lower wholesale price, more than compensates the loss in the profitability of the SB.
Value of Information Acquisition
In our model setting, we do not consider the information acquisition as a decision variable. However, via the comparison of retailer's equilibrium profits from §4.2.4 and §4.3.1, i.e., the scenario in which the retailer acquires customer information and the scenario in which there is no information acquisition, respectively, we identify the value of information acquisition as well as its impact on decisions. In this section, we report on the ex-ante value of information acquisition for the retailer and the manufacturer. In §5 we provide a detailed account of its impact on the decisions of the two parties.
A comparison of the expected profit functions shows that information acquisition is always beneficial for the retailer. This is an expected result given that there is no cost associated with information acquisition in our model setting. So, we report on the benefits of information acquisition, and these benefits can be compared with the costs associated with information collection (e.g., sales force training, information technology, etc.) to decide on the optimal information acquisition strategy. We also report on the value of information measured as the percentage change in the retailer's and manufacturer's profit compared to the no information acquisition case.
Proposition 6. The value of consumer taste information acquisition for the retailer has an increasing-decreasing behaviour with respect to the SB equity.
• If the retailer cannot afford introducing a SB in the absence of information (due to the high fixed cost), a higher SB equity implies a higher value of acquired information.
• If the retailer is able to afford introducing a SB even in the absence of information, a higher SB equity implies a lower value of acquired information.
Retailer's information acquisition is valuable for the manufacturer only if the SB equity is below a certain threshold value. Figure 6 illustrates the value of information for the retailer and the manufacturer as a function of the SB equity. As we can see, the value of information sharing has a non-monotonic behaviour both for the retailer and the manufacturer with respect to the SB equity. For relatively low values of the SB equity (e ≤ 8F ), the retailer does not introduce a SB in the absence of information, since the expected benefits of the SB introduction does not justify the fixed cost. In this region, taste information may allow the retailer to introduce a SB and therefore the value of information is higher for a stronger SB. When the SB equity is high (e ≥ 8F ), the retailer introduces the SB even in the absence of taste information. However, the relative value of information acquisition is then lower for a stronger SB, i.e., the value of information is decreasing in the brand equity. The reason is that the marginal benefits from a higher e are actually higher in the absence of taste information. From a managerial perspective this highlights the fact that the value of information acquisition is not necessarily higher for a stronger SB. In fact, gathering information regarding consumers' taste is likely to be more valuable when the retailer faces difficulty in justifying the SB introduction -either due to high costs or due to lower equity. The value of information acquisition. Fixed cost is assumed to be F = 0.1 in this illustration.
SB is introduced only when the retailer acquires informa6on
SB is introduced in both informa6on acquisi6on and no informa6on acquisi6on scenarios
Our second observation is that retailer's information acquisition proves to be beneficial for the manufacturer only when the SB is in a weak position compared to the NB. This is an intuitive finding since when the SB is weak, it is very likely that the retailer will not introduce a SB, but will Nalca, Boyaci and Ray Consumer taste uncertainty in the context of store brand and national brand competition 25 still share the information with the manufacturer so that the NB can target the larger customer segment and provide a better fit product.
Impact of Information Acquisition on Positioning and Pricing Decisions
In this section, we discuss how information sharing, product introduction, and positioning decisions are shaped by the retailer's information acquisition. 8 In other words, we analyze how the realized consumer taste impacts the retailer and manufacturer decisions (compared to the case without information). We identify two fundamental effects: the direct effect and the indirect effect. Figure   7 provides visual aid for our description of these two effects.
The direct effect of information acquisition is that the retailer can make better SB introduction and positioning decisions by being informed about consumers' taste. For instance, in region A the direct effect ensures that the retailer introduces a SB with the popular feature and target the larger customer segment as opposed to taking chances by introducing a SB without taste information (or not introducing a SB at all). In region B, the SB positioning strategy of the retailer is the same in both information acquisition and no information acquisition scenarios; therefore, there is no value of the direct effect. In region C, the direct effect allows the retailer to avoid a non-profitable SB introduction if the NB turns out to be the product with the popular feature. In region D, the direct effect enables the retailer to introduce a SB (as opposed to not introducing due to the high fixed cost) with the popular feature when the NB turns out to be located in the smaller segment.
In region E, on the other hand, the direct effect does not exist since the retailer does not introduce a SB. In general, as expected, the direct effect benefits (in a weak sense) the retailer and is likely to hurt the manufacturer.
The indirect effect of information acquisition is that if the retailer shares information, then the manufacturer can make better NB positioning decisions. The indirect effect may benefit or hurt the retailer since the product positioning decisions of an informed manufacturer may decrease or increase the retail profits. For instance, in region A, the retailer introduces a SB when informed about the consumer taste, yet, the indirect effect is still positive since the NB positioning of the manufacturer is aligned with the interests of the retailer. In regions B, C, and D, on the other hand, the indirect effect is negative for the retailer since an informed manufacturer takes the lead and integrates the popular feature in the NB design when the retailer actually wants that position for his SB. In region E indirect effect enables the manufacturer to target the larger customer segment with a specialized product. Yet, in this case, the retailer also benefits from this since a better placed NB captures a higher demand and the retailer does not need to introduce a SB.
Figure 7
The interaction between the direct and indirect effects of information acquisition and sharing.
e 4 e 8 Direct (none) Indirect (+)
These effects are similar to the efficiency effect and the strategic effect in Guo (2009) . Guo (2009) looks at the impact of demand uncertainty on the pricing decisions of the manufacturer and the retailer for a NB product (there is no SB). As such, the efficiency and the strategic effects are materialized in pricing decisions. In our setting, however, the direct and indirect effects manifest themselves through product positioning. Moreover, we identify new interactions between these effects that have not yet been observed in the extant literature. Specifically, the indirect effect is observed in isolation in regions B and E. More importantly, when the two effects are observed simultaneously, the value of the direct effect may be augmented or diminished by the indirect one.
Specifically, in regions C and D we observe that the direct effect is positive in the absence of the indirect effect. On the hand, there is no direct effect in the presence of the indirect effect. In other words, the indirect effect totally eradicates the benefits of the direct effect. Therefore, the retailer does not share information with the manufacturer. On the other hand, in region A, the indirect effect not only benefits the retailer but also increases the value of the direct effect; as a result, the retailer voluntarily shares information with the manufacturer.
In summary, our analysis demonstrates that the implications of these effects in terms of product introduction and positioning can be quite sophisticated depending on the degree of marketpreference and the cost of SB introduction.
Concluding Discussion
Retailers' proximity to consumers provide them with a great opportunity to learn about consumer preferences, and identify product features that are valued highly. In this paper, we investigate the impact of retailer's information acquisition regarding consumers' taste in the context of NB and SB competition. Embedded in this, we also identify the optimal information sharing strategy for the retailer with a manufacturer in a dyadic supply chain framework.
Our analysis shows that the ex-ante value of costless information acquisition regarding consumers' taste is always positive for the retailer. This information acquisition reduces the uncertainty in consumers' taste and allows the retailer to make better product introduction and positioning decisions. However, the impact of retailer's information acquisition on the manufacturer is not straightforward. In fact, we show that the manufacturer benefits from the retailer's information acquisition only if the NB is in a relatively strong position compared to the SB in terms of equity,
i.e., the degree of vertical differentiation between the NB and the SB is high in favour of the NB.
It is plausible that retail managers consider information acquisition concurrently with investments to improve SB equity. However, retail managers should be cautious about these decisions since the value of information acquisition may be complementary or supplementary to the value of improving the equity of the SB. In particular, if the retailer is able to afford SB introduction in the absence of taste information, then simultaneously investing in information acquisition and in SB equity should be avoided. In that case, an increase in SB equity actually decreases the value of information acquisition. On the other hand, if the retailer finds it too costly to introduce a SB in the presence of taste information, then simultaneously investing in acquiring consumer taste information and in SB equity is a beneficial strategy as they support each other in terms of value and may justify SB introduction.
Our findings show that the overall value of the acquired information depends on its direct and indirect effects. The direct effect is that the retailer improves its SB introduction and positioning decisions by being informed about consumers' taste. The indirect effect refers to the changes in the NB positioning as a result of information sharing with the manufacturer. In fact, depending on the relative popularity of different features and the cost of SB introduction, information sharing can augment or diminish the benefits of the direct effect, and hence sharing consumers' taste information can be beneficial or detrimental for the retailer. Below, we provide a full characterization of the retailers information sharing strategy with respect to the cost of introducing a SB (shortly SB-cost) and the relative popularity of different product features across the customer segments.
• If different product features are about equally popular amongst customers and SB-cost is low, then retail managers should not share taste information with the manufacturer. Moreover, unfortunately, there is no value of the acquired information for the retailer.
• If a product feature is mildly more popular amongst customers compared to the other and SBcost is at intermediate levels, then retail managers should still avoid information sharing. However, the retailer can capitalize on the information acquired by making better SB introduction decisions.
• If a product feature is very popular amongst customers and SB-cost is not very high, then the retail managers should capitalize on this opportunity by introducing a SB with the popular feature. Furthermore, they should be eager to share the acquired information. Information sharing,
Consumer taste uncertainty in the context of store brand and national brand competition through the better positioned NB, increases the value of the acquired information for the retailer even though it may intensify the price competition between the NB and the SB.
• Lastly, if the SB-cost is very high, then it is likely that the retailer will not introduce a SB.
However, the retailer should still share information with the manufacturer; it leads to a better NB in terms of fit, which benefits both parties. In fact, there is no value of the acquired information for the retailer unless shared with the manufacturer.
In our analysis, we make some simplifying assumptions. For instance, in order to keep the analysis tractable, we do not consider the role of NB competition. Obviously, modelling NB competition (as well as retail competition) would provide new insights. However, it would also complicate the product positioning decisions. Indeed, to the best of our knowledge, papers in the extant literature incorporate NB competition at the expense of product positioning decisions -which is an important aspect of our research. Also, in order to provide a simple intuition as to the impact of taste information on product positioning, we restrict our attention to three distinct points in the product feature space. This can be generalized by allowing the products to be positioned at any point. Our preliminary analysis for this extension shows that this generalization considerably complicates the pricing and product positioning decisions of the brands.
In closing, this study is a first attempt to examine the implications of information acquisition regarding consumers' taste in the context of national brand and store brand competition. We show to what extent and why retailers are likely to benefit from such information, and we also identify the conditions that motivate the retailer to share taste information with the manufacturer as well as the conditions that motivate withholding such information from the manufacturer.
